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Abstract  
 
Experimental engineering models have been used both to model general 
phenomena, such as the onset of turbulence in fluid flow, and to predict the 
performance of machines of particular size and configuration in particular 
contexts. 
 
Various sorts of knowledge are involved in the method -- logical consistency, 
general scientific principles, laws of specific sciences, and experience.  
I critically examine three different accounts of the foundations of the method 
of experimental engineering models (scale models), and examine how theory, 
practice, experience are involved in employing the method to obtain practical 
results. 
 
Models of machines and mechanisms can be (and generally are) involved in 
establishing criteria for similar phenomena, which provide guidance in using 
events to model other events.  Conversely, models of phenomena such as 
events that model other events can be (and generally are) involved in 
experimentation on models of machines. 
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I conclude that often it is not more detailed models or the more precise 
equations they engender that leads to better understanding, but rather an 
insightful use of knowledge at hand to determine which similarity principles 
are appropriate in allowing us to infer what we do not know from what we are 
able to observe. 
 
 
In December 2003,  a pilot set out to fly a full-scale replica of a machine that had 
been flown a hundred years earlier.  The flight was planned as part of a 
centennial celebration of the first sustained human-piloted, powered, controlled 
heavier-than-air flight.  The attempt, made December 17th,  took place at the 
same spot -- Kill Devil Hills, North Carolina -- where Orville Wright made a 
successful, historically significant flight with his flying machine, and exactly one 
hundred years to the minute after it.  The organization that built the replica had 
spent years building an exact replica of the structure and the engine, using 
exactly the same materials used in the original, even using period tools to build 
some of its parts.   
 
But the flight did not go as hoped. The replica of the flyer flown in December 
1903 did not get off the ground on that day in 2003 when the re-enactment was 
attempted in front of the crowd of over 30,000 people who had come to witness it.   
 
CBS News reported the event with the clever headline:  “Wright Re-enactment 
Goes Wrong.”  (Associated Press, 2003)  This evaluation of the event as a 
failure, however, was only an evaluation of that particular event as a re-
enactment of the event on December 17, 1903.   That is, put as a descriptive 
statement, the headline was simply stating the lack of similarity in performance 
between two particular situations: the one on December 17th 1903 and the one 
on December 17th 2003.   
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The organization sponsoring the event drew a different comparison than the 
headline CBS News used would imply:   
 
Our attempt at flight on December 17, 2003 replicated almost exactly the 
Wright brothers' first public attempt at flight, May 23, 1904. Lack of wind, 
engine trouble, and Wilbur got as far as the end of the rail...and went 
nowhere.  (Wright Experience, 2004)  
 
Thus, as a re-enactment of a different event  that took place on May 23, 1904,  
they claimed, the event was actually a success!  What occurred on December 17, 
2003 at Kill Devil Hills, they pointed out, was in fact similar to another particular 
event -- not the one that took place exactly a hundred years previous to it in that 
same location, but to an event that occurred in 1904, in a field called Huffman 
Prairie in Ohio.  Actually, the CBS headline notwithstanding, the body of the CBS 
news article text conceded their claim:  “Though disappointing, the failed first try 
at a re-enactment was not historically inaccurate.” (Associated Press, 2003). 
 
The claim had some merit: despite the painstaking attention to detail expended in 
constructing their model of the machine -- an exact, full-scale replica, in this case 
-- what we’re often most interested in, and what constitutes physical similarity, is 
similar performance.  That is, the goal is to have the phenomena of  interest 
associated with the thing being modelled arise in the model, too -- here, the 
phenomenon of interest is that the flying machine become airborne in a 
controlled, manned, sustained flight.  The replication of details such as the exact 
day of the year, time of day, and geographical location are not relevant to 
bringing about that phenomenon.  The atmospheric conditions are.  
 
There are other phenomenon associated with the original event in 1903 that are 
not captured by any possible re-enactment of it in 2003.  Nobody would claim 
that any re-enactment of the 1903 event, no matter how successful, would carry 
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with it the historical significance of the original event.  The original event was 
historically significant in that it proved that the problem of controlling sustained 
powered human-piloted flying machines had finally been solved.  The later 
effects this achievement would have on society as a whole --- how, once the 
news spread to Europe, money would be invested by nations as well as by 
private industrialists in airplanes and airplane manufacturing ventures, that there 
would be major changes in how fast mail could be delivered, in how warfare 
would be conducted,  and so on --- are not associated with the re-enactment.   
Yet, this is not because economic and social phenomena cannot be the basis of 
similarity between particular situations.  
 
In fact, judgements of similarity regarding the historical significance of the 1903 
event have been made, just recently.  I am referring, of course,  to the historical 
flights of the privately developed spacecraft SpaceShipOne, which has been 
referred to as the “Wright Flyer of spacecraft” (Shostak, 2004) The similarity to 
Orville Wright’s historic flight is being drawn on the basis of the historical 
significance of the event, rather than on the basis of similarity of the physics of 
the event.  SpaceShipOne won a competition with a 10 million dollar prize, called 
the X-Prize, which required repeated, controlled space flights by a spacecraft 
whose design and execution was privately funded.  Several self-made 
entrepreneurs dedicated time and significant parts of their personal fortunes 
towards the design of a spacecraft built to win the prize, with the ultimate goal of 
a successful commercial venture of a new sort -- suborbital space travel.   
 
Those who call the spacecraft “the Wright Flyer of spacecraft” do so because 
they think it will change the nature of space travel in society.  Like the Wright 
Flyer, it was privately developed and cost a fraction of the sum spent by a 
government-funded program with the same goal.  Comparisons were made 
between the fact that the Wright Brothers constructed their own wind tunnel, and 
the fact that the SpaceShipOne inventor likewise improvised in lieu of using 
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expensive government or university research facilities: for example, by using the 
back of a pickup truck speeding in a straight line through the desert as a test rig 
for studying airflow over airfoils.  Like the Wright Flyer, SpaceShipOne will 
provide a flight experience hitherto unavailable that many are eager to pay for, at 
a price they can actually pay.  In drawing a comparison between Orville Wright’s 
historic flight in December of 1903 and the flights being flown in pursuit of the X-
Prize in October 2004, the similarity between the particular event in 1903 and the 
particular event in 2004 is based on the economic and societal significance of the 
event.  Such comparisons are relevant to answering questions about what kinds 
of resources and incentives are necessary conditions for certain kinds of 
technological achievements. 
 
Now, as I’ve just stated it, what constitutes similarity is relative to a phenomenon 
-- the phenomenon of interest.  The notion of similarity I invoke here is the notion 
of similarity used in physics in the most general sense: physical similarity, of 
which some special kinds are dynamic similarity, kinematic similarity, and 
hydrodynamic similarity.  The general idea is that the mapping between things -- 
events, machines, systems, phenomena --- preserves the structure of the 
situation that is relevant to the phenomenon of interest.  When two systems are 
physically similar, a similarity mapping can be drawn based on keeping  certain 
relationships (or ratios) of the quantities or elements in one system the same as 
certain relations (or ratios) of the quantities or elements in the other.  Having the 
same relevant relations (or ratios) between elements or quantities is what 
guarantees or shows that the two systems have the same structure.  Now, each 
event, machine, system, or phenomena has lots of different kinds of structures;  
these are picked out or highlighted by the relationships (dimensionless ratios) 
that characterize that particular structure.   How do you know what structure to 
identify?  Which relationships (or ratios) are kept the same between model and 
thing modeled is a matter of what structure is of interest, and that in turn depends 
on what phenomenon is of interest.  Different structures are responsible (in some 
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cases we might even want to say causally responsible) for different phenomena, 
and different structures are picked out by different similarity mappings.    
 
I just talked about three different similarity comparisons.  First,  the static 
mechanical-structural similarity between the exact replica of the machine 
produced in 2003 and the original one produced in 1903.  Then, the dynamic 
similarity of the 2003 event and an event in 1904 -- occasions on which an exact 
replica of  the Wright Flyer and the original, respectively, performed similarly 
poorly.  And, finally, there was the similarity between the 1903 event and 
SpaceShipOne’s successful flight in 2004, based upon similarity of historical 
significance.   Thus, similarity is itself defined in terms of interests.  If we are 
talking about human endeavors, these will be interests humans have.  That 
similarity turns out on this account to be relative to human interests is not an 
oversight on my part --- nor is it a drawback to the use of similarity.   It does not 
mean that similarity is subjective as opposed to objective, merely that similarity is 
relative to a phenomenon.  There is no such thing as absolute similarity; similarity 
can only be similarity with respect to some feature or phenomenon of interest.    
 
The use of similarity in scientific inference is ubiquitous, although it is not always 
explicitly recognized.  For instance, observations of events in the laboratory are 
considered informative about other things and events that go beyond the 
specifics of the observed case.  In so doing, we are implicitly assuming there is a 
class of events or situations that are similar to the given event, and that the given 
event is informative of other events in that class.  This is true in general, whether 
the area is mechanics, acoustics, hydrodynamics, chemistry, or whatever.   A 
twofold question now arises:  (i) when an observation is made on a specific setup 
in a controlled laboratory setting or in a natural setting, what determines the class 
of other events to which it is deemed similar?  And (ii) what kind of 
correspondence is there between the observed event and these other events?   
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To take an especially striking example in the philosophical literature, consider 
experiments done using laboratory setups in hydrodynamics.  Margaret Morrison 
has discussed Ludwig Prandtl’s experimental investigations of fluid flow over a 
sphere using a water tank.  Let’s take a closer look at what is involved in the step 
she describes as follows:  “Although the existence of frictional forces were 
known, what the experiments indicated was that the flow about a solid body can 
be divided into two parts, the thin layer in the neighbourhood of the body where 
friction plays an essential role (the boundary layer) and the region outside this 
layer where it can be neglected.” ((Morrison, 1999, p. 55)  The question I want to 
ask about this is:  “What was the basis for making inferences about cases other 
than the specific case in the laboratory setup Prandtl used?”   That is, what was 
the criterion for saying which other cases are like the one observed, and in what 
respect?  What is our basis for being able to say which other objects and setups 
would behave like the one observed, were the experiment run on them?  Think of 
the disappointing re-enactment of the flight attempted with an exact replica of the 
airplane I described at the opening of this paper.  It is not that the explanation of 
the performance is a mystery to us;  the point is that that example illustrates that 
distinctions need to be made in order to pick out the cases that will behave 
similarly from those that will not.  In his paper in this volume, Michael 
Heidelberger discusses Ludwig Prandtl’s work on the theory of the boundary 
layer.   
 
In general, if we want to play it absolutely safe in drawing inferences from an 
observed case, we would have to restrict our inference to cases using exactly the 
same fluid at exactly the same temperature and pressure, flowing at exactly the 
same velocity, in exactly the same geometrical configuration, at exactly the same 
scale.  We would also have to use exactly the same size and shape of object, 
made of exactly the same material with exactly the same surface finish.  Even 
after all that, we’d have to hope that no external time-varying factors such as 
sunspots made a difference to the phenomena we’d observe.  Of course this is 
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unsatisfactory.  The observations are taken to have more generality, and they 
need to be, if we are to gain any practical knowledge.  But, on what basis is the 
generalization of the observation made?  
 
The experimenter needs to have enough insight into what the phenomena 
depends upon to know how to characterize equivalent classes of situations, that 
is, situations that are equivalent with respect to giving rise to the phenomenon of 
interest.  Although some insights can be gained by varying individual variables 
such as velocity, density, viscosity, size, and so on one by one, ultimately what is 
needed, however it is obtained, is the ability to characterize situations and 
determine which situations are similar to each other with respect to the 
phenomenon of interest.  Without that crucial ability, all one has is an inventory of 
observations of individual cases.   
 
Thus, an experimenter needs to have some criterion for similarity, and, in fact, is 
employing similarity criteria whether or not he or she realizes it.  That’s my 
general point, and my point about Prandtl’s experiment in particular is that 
Prandtl did not start from scratch with respect to criteria for hydrodynamical 
similarity.  To carry out the kind of investigations he did, he needed to be able 
already to characterize the kind of situations he was going to investigate, and that 
means he used some criteria of hydrodynamical similarity, whether good or bad.  
A researcher using incorrect similarity criteria is not going to get robust results 
from his or her investigations.  Prandtl used appropriate similarity criteria, and he 
obtained spectacularly robust results. 
 
Fortunately, Prandtl already had pretty good reasons for suspecting that one of  
the nondimensional factors on which the phenomenon he was investigating 
would depend would be the nondimensional parameter now known as Reynolds 
number.   The Reynolds number is a product involving fluid density, relative fluid 
velocity, a linear dimension, and viscosity, all in a single nondimensional 
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parameter.  This had been the result of many years of work by Osborne 
Reynolds, beginning with his observation that temperature seemed to affect fluid 
flow phenomena, and in turn that viscosity varies with temperature.  From 
Reynolds’ work, too, Prandtl -- and all the world --- knew that the formation of 
patterns of vortices in viscous fluids was an important phenomenon to investigate 
and categorize.  And, again, the relevant criterion of similarity of situations -- i.e., 
the basis on which to identify equivalence classes of situations, was the 
Reynolds number.   
 
Another clue about similarity that Prandtl had to work with came from William 
Froude’s work on towing ship hulls in water tanks.  Froude had shown that when 
a ship hull was moving with respect to a fluid,  there was a layer of water that 
formed near the ship hull, and Froude carrried out investigations specifically on 
the causes and effects of this “skin” phenomenon (which would later be called the 
boundary layer).  Froude’s case itself illustrates my general point.  
 
Several decades before Prandtl’s experiments, Froude used a water tank for the 
purpose of experimenting on scaled-down models of ship hulls being towed 
through water.  Now, the question is, what did experimental observations on that 
case tell him?  The answer is found in the similarity these experimental setups 
have to other setups.  Since similarity is relative to a phenomenon, the question 
only makes sense in the context of specifying a phenomenon of interest.  Using 
the similarity law of his day, Froude said that observations on his model told him 
the resistance of a ship hull of the same shape but of a size n times as large, 
travelling at that velocity times the square root of n,  if you scale the resistance up 
by n3.  This basis for similarity is similarity with respect to the effects of 
gravitational forces, and it only gave good results if viscosity was not important to 
the phenomenon of interest,  the overall resistance the ship experienced in 
travelling through the water.  Froude did realize, though, that as you used smaller 
and smaller sized scale models, there were disproportionate effects that was 
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probably due to the viscosity of the fluid.  Froude observed that viscous shear on 
the full size ship hull models created a layer of fluid that “stuck” against the hull, 
but further hypothesized that the fluid within this layer was in motion with respect 
to the ship hull. Once he began to suspect that in fact the phenomenon of 
interest, resistance to a ship travelling in the water, might depend not only on 
gravitational forces but also on viscous forces, he devised a method to account 
for it.  (Rouse and Ince, 1957, p. 185)  The details here are not important.  The 
point is that the observations on the laboratory model do not stand on their own -- 
in order to associate the observations made in one situation with any other 
situation, you need a basis on which to make similarity judgements.   
 
Froude’s investigations led him to attribute this difference to the phenomenon 
now called the boundary layer, and in turn to attribute that phenomenon to fluid 
friction, or viscosity.  This was another clue about what was a relevant criteria for 
similarity.  All this was the background knowledge about hydrodynamical 
similarity that preceded Prandtl’s work.  This background knowledge enabled him 
to properly characterize the fluid flow situations he was investigating.  My point is 
that this was crucial in two ways:  it was crucial to his  being able to achieve the 
experimental results he did in the first place, and it was crucial to the results he 
obtained being applicable to other situations.   
 
Let me bring out this same two-sided point with another example from history of 
science:  the principle of corresponding states, from chemistry and 
thermodynamics.  This principle, due to van der Waals, has appeared a few 
times in discussions by philosophers of science (Glymour, 1970; Morrison 1988 ), 
but usually in the contexts of scientific realism or theory reduction.   The 
limitations of Boyle’s law (PV = RT) were well-known in van der Waals’s day:  
Boyle’s law applied only for low pressures and high temperatures, it didn’t apply 
to the liquid state, and it didn’t describe the transition between vapor and liquid 
states.  The popularity of steam engines led to a practical interest in vapor-liquid 
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transitions, and to observations of  rapidly increasing pressures of enclosed 
vapor at temperatures above the boiling point of water.  Experiments were also 
carried out on enclosed liquids and vapors of other substances, which led to 
cataloguing the critical temperatures of various liquids, and to liquefying gases at 
ambient temperatures by compressing them. (Sengers, 2002, p. 14) 
  
What may have stimulated Van der Waals to develop his equation was Thomas 
Andrews’s work on the state of a substance at which vapor and liquid are 
identical, which Andrews called the “critical point”.  Andrews also investigated 
what happened when compressing vapor above the critical temperature, coining 
the term “continuity of states.”  (Sengers, 2002,  p. 14 )  Van der Waals added 
two parameters to Boyle’s Law, “a” and “b”, both constants meant to reflect 
characteristics of a specific substance.  The two parameters were to account for 
the factors of the volume the molecules occupy and the mutually attractive forces 
between them.  So, what van der Waals did here was to use some partial 
knowledge about the model he suspected was responsible for the phenomenon 
being described.    
 
The Van der Waals equation was far more than a detailed version of Boyle’s law 
-- unlike Boyle’s law, it explained fluid criticality and continuity of states, and it 
qualitatively described empirical results of new investigations being carried out.   
But the most significant conceptual step was the principle of corresponding 
states.  The principle of corresponding states arises out of applying the van der 
Waals equation to find the critical points of a given substance in terms of the 
parameters a and b, and then, essentially, using the values of critical pressure, 
critical volume, and critical temperature of the substance as a unit of measure.  
The pressure expressed as a ratio of pressure to critical pressure is called a 
“reduced pressure”, and reduced temperature and reduced volume are similarly 
defined.  If we retain the expressions for the critical values in terms of a and b, 
and express pressure, temperature, and volume  in these units of measure, we 
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obtain a form of the van der Waals equation in which the postulated constants a 
and b no longer appear.  The resulting equation is then in terms of reduced 
temperature, reduced pressure, and reduced volume.  Since it does not contain 
the substance-specific constants a and b,  it  applies to all substances.  The 
principle was thus an improvement over the van der Waals equation, as 
knowledge of the critical values of a substance obviated the need to determine 
the substance-specific parameters a and b.  Van der Waals did come to 
recognize that even the principle of corresponding states was only approximate.  
Yet,  as one textbook puts it:  “This is a truly remarkable result.”  pointing out that 
the equation expressing the principle of corresponding states  “is universal:  all 
characteristics of individual fluids have disappeared from it or, rather, have been 
hidden in the reduction factors.” (Sengers, 2002, p. 25)   
 
What I want to emphasize about the principle of corresponding states here is that 
we can think of it as providing a similarity criterion.  It puts into one equivalence 
class the states of all substances that are at the same reduced pressure, 
temperature, and volume.  This aspect of the principle provoked another 
scientist, Heike Kamerlingh Onnes, to look for its basis in another, known 
similarity principle.  In his Nobel lecture, Onnes said that the law of corresponding 
states “had a particular attraction for me because I thought to find the basis for it 
in the stationary mechanical similarity of substances and from this point of view 
the study of deviations in substances of simple chemical structure with low critical 
temperatures seemed particularly important.”  (Onnes, 1913)  He won the Nobel 
prize in 1913  for his success in applying these ideas to the problem of liquefying 
helium.        
 
As with most similarity principles, there are two complementary faces to the law 
of corresponding states:  on the one hand it supplies criteria for characterizing 
situations, and on the other it provides a means of translating the specific 
features of one situation into the corresponding specific features of another.  As 
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for the first aspect of the principle -- characterizing situations -- the 
characterization of a state is in terms of reduced pressure, temperature, and 
volume and is independent of the substance.  As for the second aspect, it is easy 
to see how the translation between situations works here:  take, for example, 
pressure.  Suppose you conclude you have a substance in a certain state; then 
you know the reduced pressure.   The pressure for a particular substance in that 
state can be found by multiplying the reduced pressure by the critical pressure of 
that substance.  (Sengers, 2002, p. 25) 
 
I have been emphasizing the importance of such similarity principles as 
background knowledge necessary for carrying out investigations, even laboratory 
investigations.  Let me close by saying a little about the source of such similarity 
principles. 
 
In both hydrodynamic similarity and the law of corresponding states,  the 
similarity principle is a consequence of an equation deemed applicable to the 
phenomenon being investigated: hydrodynamic similarity is a consequence of a 
fluid flow equation, and the law of corresponding states is a consequence of the 
van der Waals equation.  In general, if you’ve got a governing equation 
describing a phenomenon available, a similarity principle can be obtained 
straightforwardly by manipulating the equation into a form such that the requisite 
nondimensional parameters are obtained by inspection of the equation.  
However,  you don’t need a governing equation in order to obtain a similarity 
principle; you can get by with much less.   
 
Both hydrodynamical similarity and the law of corresponding states can be 
derived from merely the knowledge of the list of quantities upon which the 
phenomenon depends.  That means that you need only know the form of the 
equation in the most general sense, i.e., that the phenomenon is a function of 
quantity 1, quantity 2, etc.  As long as the list is complete, and doesn’t contain 
Sterrett/ Models of Machines & Models of Phenomena  -- 14 
extraneous quantities, the method of dimensional analysis will show a valid 
similarity principle valid;  i.e., that the Reynolds number is indeed a basis for 
hydrodynamical similarity, and that the law of corresponding states is indeed a 
basis for thermodynamical similarity.  Further, even if you don’t have a candidate 
similarity principle to verify, the method will also always yield results, in the form 
of  one or more nondimensional  parameters that will provide a basis for 
similarity.  It will not yield an equation describing the phenomenon, but no such 
equation is needed in order to establish similarity.  There is one drawback to the 
method;  since it is based upon a purely logical analysis of the dimensions of the 
quantities involved, the parameters produced by the method might not have 
physical significance.  So, the complaint is often made that  the method is not of 
much practical use.  
 
There is a third approach that tries to make use of all the information and 
physical insight one might have at hand.  I am taking the notion, called 
“configurational analysis”,  from a field of research called fire modelling, but it is 
applicable to any field.  Now, fires are not tidy things -- all kinds of factors matter, 
such as the configuration of the space where the fire occurs, how the 
configuration is changed by the fire devouring parts of a building, the kinds of 
materials and atmospheric conditions it encounters as it progresses,  and so on.  
The phenomena to be  modelled have probably not even been exhaustively 
catalogued.  Various types of pure science are brought to bear on the problem, 
although this is not a situation where we reasonably expect to obtain equations 
that describe the resulting phenomena.  We may use our speculations or 
knowledge about physical mechanisms or fundamental principles to pick out 
important factors that affect the phenomenon of interest.  What we use this 
information for, however, is not to solve equations.  Rather, the goal is to figure 
out similarity conditions.  We then use the similarity conditions to build models 
and, after using the model experimentally,  to infer corresponding particular 
features of the situations they are meant to model.  Alternatively, we can use 
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observational data in lieu of experimental data; then, the similarity criteria help in 
categorizing and making inferences from cases at hand.  
 
Now, as I said, one drawback of dimensional analysis was that the 
nondimensional parameters the process produces are not guaranteed to have 
any physical significance, and in order to experiment with a model, we need to 
have parameters to vary that have some physical significance.  What the 
configurational analysis approach involves is first using physical insight in 
conjunction with the logical principle of dimensional homogeneity.  In the words of 
the author of a paper entitled “Fire Modeling” from which the notion of 
“configurational analysis” comes, the method “permits the welding of similitude 
theory and a ‘feeling’ for the problem at hand”.  The guiding idea for employing a 
‘feeling’ for the problem is explained as follows:   
 
Consider a device or process subject to change in space or time.  Quantitative 
statements about the system will be statements about force, matter, or energy.  A 
statement of the existence of a balance of forces, for example, will of necessity 
contain terms which are dimensionally identical, and division through by one of 
the terms will produce a set of force ratios.  These ratios must be the same in 
similar systems. Similar statements may be made about conservation of matter 
and energy. (Hottel, 1961, p. 32) 1  
 
Thus, very general principles such as conservation laws are employed to guide 
the selection of nondimensional parameters on which a similarity principle for the 
phenomenon of interest can be obtained.  As Hottel has stated things, the 
starting point is to identify the “device or process” ,  but I think it clear that this 
includes identifying the phenomena associated with the device or the process 
that we are interested in, and any that might be causally important to it.  This is 
where background knowledge such as that small viscosities can be important, or 
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that the mutual attraction between the molecules of an enclosed gas can be 
important, is brought into the development of the similarity conditions.    
 
Hottel mentions ratios of forces, masses, and energy, but it is not hard to see that 
the same approach could be taken for problems involving quantities of other sorts 
as well. Becker (1976 ) takes a generalist approach along such lines, then spells 
out what the relevant ratios are for applications in various disciplines.  The key 
parts of this approach are to identify sources, fluxes, and boundaries, and then 
apply insights about continuity and conservation to them.  We can extend the 
approach beyond the physical sciences to the social and behavioral sciences as 
well.  Economists are used to drawing analogies between fluid flows and flows of 
currency.   Even Freud used hydraulic and thermodynamic analogies.  It is easy 
to see that the general point about using flow balances  could be employed 
whenever a process or device is conceived in terms of fluxes of any sort --  flows 
of information, birth and death rates, flows of capital investment,  flows of goods 
and natural resources, of technological expertise,  flows of nerve energies, flows 
of inhibitory signals, and so on. 
 
My point at the beginning of the paper was that similarity between particular 
situations was based upon similarity with respect to a phenomenon of interest.  
When the equations describing a phenomenon are already in hand, there is more 
than enough information to establish similarity criteria.  However, similarity 
criteria can be established with less information as well.  There are methods that 
produce similarity criteria that do not require specifying the device or process, but 
the similarity criteria they produce may not be in a meaningful or useful form.  
Now we see how a rather abstract characterization of a device or process -- a 
model of the device or process, we might well call it -- is employed in obtaining 
similarity criteria of practical significance that can be useful in designing 
experiments or collecting observational data.    
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Summarizing these reflections, we see that there are several ways that models 
can be involved in applying science:  
 
-- Anytime observations are used to make generalizations or inferences beyond 
an  observed case, one event is being used as a model of another event, or of an 
equivalence class of other events.  These comparisons are based upon similarity 
criteria, and are relative to a phenomenon or phenomena of interest.   Even 
characterizing experiments and observations involves employing similarity 
criteria, whether the person doing so realizes it or not.  Hence this use of a model 
-- using one event as a model of another, which is a model in the sense of 
modelling phenomena -- is ubiquitious in all sorts of scientific activities.  
 
-- If  the similarity criteria is obtained from an equation describing the 
phenomena,  a model in the more traditional sense of providing a mechanism 
may be involved inasmuch as a model of the device or process is often used in 
deriving the equation.  (However, having such an equation is not necessary; 
similarity criteria can be obtained even when an equation describing the 
phenomena of interest is not known.) 
 
-- In order to obtain physically meaningful and hence practically useful similarity 
criteria without the use of a governing equation,  a characterization of the device 
or process in terms of equilibrium or steady-state flow fluxes, sources, and 
boundaries is valuable in conjunction with the formal method of dimensional 
analysis.  Balances and conservation principles can be applied to guide the 
construction of the nondimensional parameters used as similarity criteria.   
 
Thus, models of machines and mechanisms can be (and generally are) involved 
in establishing criteria for similar phenomena,  and these criteria provide 
guidance in using events to model other events.  Conversely,  models of 
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phenomena such as events that model other events can be (and generally are) 
involved in experimentation on models of machines. 
 
I like Margaret Morrison’s remark, situating my points here in general philosophy 
of science;  she says:  “A good deal of literature in philosophy of science has 
emphasized the role of analogies in inductive inference; what I take Sterrett to 
have shown is why, in certain respects, analogies work.” (Morrison, this volume, 
p. xx )  On the account I have presented here, we see that often it is not more 
detailed models or the more precise equations they engender that leads to better 
understanding.  Often, what is most helpful is an insightful use of the knowledge 
at hand to determine which similarity principles are most appropriate in allowing 
us to infer what we do not know from what we are able to observe.  I hope my 
discussion here helps in getting more precise about that insight.      
 
 
Acknowledgements:  I am totally indebted to the work of Henry Becker on scale 
modelling in chemical engineering research for drawing attention to Hottel’s 
paper, which Becker cites for an explanation of what he calls “configurational 
analysis”.   Becker’s treatment (Becker, 1976) is reflective and philosophical.  
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